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Abstract _ 
Van Damme (Oct 87) claims that renegotiation and stability may be mutually inconsistent 
concepts. This note shows that this claim may be incorrect and proposes a way to restore the 
compatibility of these two concepts that, in general, do not apply in the same context. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
This note discusses the relation between the concepts of renegotiation-proof and stable 
equilibria. In particular, the question about existence of stable renegotiation is addressed. This 
discussion is motivated by an example with which van Damme claims that the answer to this 
question is negative. The example is a fInite horizon game of two players, the defInition of 
renegotiation-proof he uses is the Pareto perfect equilibrium (PPE, widely accepted for this 
class of games) and the definition of stability is the one given by Kohlberg and Mertens 
(1986) (see appendix). The concept of Pareto perfect equilibrium was first introduced by 
Farrell and Maskin (1989) and by Bernheim and Ray (1989). Here we present the definition 
using the notation in van Damme (Oct 87): 
DEFINITION 1 Let G be a normal form game and let G(T) be the T-fold repetition of 
G. Then s is a PPE of G(1) if it is a Nash equilibrium (NE) of G that is not (strictly) 
Pareto dominated by another equilibrium. Inductively, s is a PPE of G(t+ 1) if 
(1) s is a Nash equilibrium of G(t+ 1) 
(2) s continues with a PPE of G(t) after each period 1 history, and 
(3) there does not exist s' satisfying (1) and (2) that strictly Pareto dominates s. 
Now we can present van Damme's example: consider the bimatrix game G in figure 1, 
and let G(2) be the 2-fold repetition of G. 
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FIGURE 1 
Write A=(a,a), B=(b,t3) and C=(c,'Y) and consider the following strategy pair s* 
in G(2): 
rB after A 
(*) at t=l play A at t=2 play { 
l C otherwise 
Clearly s* satisfies definition 1. This strategy results in a payoff of 14 for each player. 
Van-Damme shows that all PPEa of G(2) yield the same path as s*, and that this 
equilibrium component cannot be stable. The intuitive reason is as follows: 
"Player 1 is 'guaranteed' the payoff 14 if he does not deviate from (A,B). If 
he, however, deviates to b at t= 1, then player 2 should conclude that 1 will 
not play c as b followed by c yields player 1 at most 12 and this is less 
than what this player gets in equilibrium. Furthermore, 1 will not play a in 
the second round as this is dominated by b. Hence, player 2 should conclude 
that 1 will again play b after a deviation, but then he should respond with 
t3 (his best response) and 1 will indeed gain from deviating. The equilibrium 
is not self-enforcing, Le it is not stable". (van Damrne (Qct 87)) 
In another place, van Damrne notes that 
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"stability is a pure non cooperative concept, hence, it requires that all aspects 
relevant to the situation be modeled by the rules of the game. This is important 
as it will turn out that stable equilibria depend crucially on modeling 'details'. 
Hence, stability is inconsistent with 'small words' arguments and if one cannot 
model all details, then stability should not be used as the solution concept." 
(van Danune (Aug 87». 
However, in van Danune (Oct 87), he confronts the notion of stability with a definition 
of renegotiation-proof equilibrium, the Pareto perfect equilibrium (PPE), which, in his own 
words "seems especially justified if players have the opportunity to conununicate during the 
game". In order to be able to compare both concepts in the same context, van Danune 
appeals to Schelling' s (1960) principle of tacit bargaining to conclude that "if the requirement 
(of PPE) is really compelling, then ... players should accept the same concept also in the case 
in which no such conununication is possible. (Especially in case there is a unique 
renegotiation-proof equilibrium, as in our example)." 
In this note I will try to show that the incompatibility between the two concepts may 
disappear once the following two claims are realized: 
CLAIM 1. The principle of tacit bargaining does not apply in general when conununication 
may take place. 
CLAIM 2. In the particular cases when the principle seems to be applicable, the PPE may 
not be the "good" definition of a renegotiation-proof equilibrium if one considers stability 
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issues. 
2. DISCUSSION OF CLAIM 1 
If a definition of equilibrium is to be interpreted as a theory of how players would 
behave, it is clear that any suggested strategy profile that does not conform to that definition 
will not be obeyed: players will find some incentive to deviate. This is true for the Nash 
equilibrium and all its refinements. For instance, if players believe in the theory of perfect 
Nash equilibria, some player will unilaterally deviate from a non-perfect Nash equilibrium 
because he or she will be afraid of "trembling hand" moves by other players. However, the 
same cannot be said about the PPE if the game is to be played without communication. To 
see this, consider the game in figure 2: 
FIGURE 2 
Only (m,c) and (b,r) are PPE. If players believe in the theory of PPE, they will choose 
among these two pairs of strategies, but if they cannot communicate with each other, (t,l) 
cannot be discarded as an equilibrium. Even if they are fervent believers of the PPE and 
know which are the PPEa of the game, they have no way to move from (t,l) if this strategy 
is somehow proposed first: they need communication to go to either (m.c) or (b,r). The 
knowledge of the theory of PPE is useful in general only if communication exists (that was 
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precisely the motivation for renegotiation-proof equilibria). Another examples of this kind 
may occur when coalitions are pennitted to deviate (e.g. in the Coalition-proof Nash 
equilibrium or in the strong Nash equilibrium concepts): it may happen that a coalition is 
necessary to deviate from a "bad" equilibrium, but if several coalitions are possible, again 
communication is necessary to decide which one will be fonned. For very particular 
examples, however it is true that communication is not necessary to apply the PPE. For 
example, in figure 3, the knowledge and acceptance of the theory of PPE make players 
simultaneously move from (t,l) to (b,r). This occurs, of course because there is only one 
place to go according to the theory. 
FIGURE 3 
Therefore, in general, we need communication to apply the definition of PPE as a 
theory that predicts players' behavior, but then, following van Damme, stability in the sense 
of Kohlberg and Mertens is not a relevant concept and we do not have any incompatibility: 
stability simply does not apply. 
I will finish this section with two more examples to show how stability issues (and 
forward induction arguments) may be ruled out when communication may take place. The 
first one is the example given in van Damme (Qct 87), it will also be analyzed without 
communication (as van Damme did) in the discussion of claim 2 in the following section. 
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Let us consider, then, van Damme's example: if the PPE (s"') is proposed and 
communication can take place, then we find that player 1 will not deviate: if he does deviate 
at the first stage (as in the discussion for stability in van Damme), at the beginning of the 
second stage he will find that player 2 will recall the first agreement (s"') which implies that 
C will follow, since it is an equilibrium. Of course, player 1 may defend his new proposal 
B based on his last deviation, but since B is now viewed as a deviation from C, it has no 
chance to survive because not all players involved (read player 2) find it attractive. 
As a last example consider the game of battle of sexes in figure 4. 
FIGURE 4 
If player 2 has the opportunity to "bum a dollar" before playing, it is well known that there 
is only one stable equilibrium in which player 2 does not bum the dollar and (t,l) follows. 
With communication, however, (b,r) is still plausible: if (b,r) is decided and player 2 
bums the dollar to show that he will play aggressively afterwards (to induce (t,I», at the 
beginning of the second stage he will hear from player 1 something like: "Ok, you burnt a 
dollar, so what? we planned to play now (b,r) and we shall do that way since it is an 
equilibrium; your deviation is worthless so you better follow the equilibrium path. " 
3. DISCUSSION OF CLAIM 2 
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For the cases in which the principle of tacit bargaining is applicable and no 
communication is necessary to have a PPE as a result (e.g. when only one such equilibrium 
exists as in the game in figure 3 above), it may well be the case that a PPE is not stable. An 
illustration of this is van Damme's example, but one can argue that if that game is to be 
played without communication and if players believe in the theories of both Renegotiation-
proof and stable equilibria, then it is not clear why at the beginning they will choose s, the 
Pareto optimal within the subgame perfect equilibria. They are now aware of forward 
induction arguments and know that a deviation will occur, therefore, the PPE is not the 
"good" renegotiation-proof equilibrium in this case. Players should better concentrate their 
attention on the set of strategy profiles that are "optimal within the set of stable equilibria". 
The formal definition of this "Pareto Stable equilibrium", using van Damme's notation, is as 
follows: 
DEFINITION 2. s is a Pareto stable equilibrium (PSE) of G(1) if and only if it is a stable 
equilibrium (SE) of G that is not strictly dominated by any other equilibrium. Inductively, 
s is a PSE of G(t+ 1) iff 
(1) s is a SE of G(t+ 1) 
(2) s continues with a PSE of G(t) after each period 1 stage history and 
(3) there does not exist s' satisfying (1) and (2) that strictly Pareto dominates 
s. 
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REMARK 1. SE is the definition of stable equilibrium by Kohlberg and Mertens. 
REMARK 2. Since SEa always exist when the sets of strategies are compact, the existence 
of PSEa is immediate for those games with a compact set of outcomes in SEa. 
REMARK 3. In van Darnme's example, it is easy to check that the only two PSEa are: 
(i) play (m,c) in the fIrst period and (b,l) in the second after any history and 
(ii) play (b,l) in the first period and (m,c) in the second after any history. 
5. FINAL COMMENTS 
Pareto perfectness is a definition that is very generally applicable. Stability, however, 
is only meaningful in a very special kind of situations. To make the point simpler, consider 
van Damrne's condition for stability (in the sense of forward induction) in two-player games: 
"A solution concept S is consistent with forward induction on the class of 
generic 2-person games if pE S for any path p for which there exists a 
player i who by unilaterally deviating from p can enforce that a sUbgame 
is reached for which exactly one solution (according to S) yields this player 
more than p does and for which all other solutions yield this player less". 
(van Darnme (Aug 87». 
It is clear that, for this definition to be applicable (in the sense that it restricts the set 
of solutions), one needs a coincidence to happen (" .. , exactly one solution ... "). Furthermore, 
the cases in which both PPE and SE are applicable concepts are even more restricted: in 
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addition, one needs the coincidence that makes the principle of tacit bargaining adequate (as 
in the discussion of claim 2). As a result, only in a very particular set of games both concepts 
can be contrasted. It has been shown that, in this case, the definition of PPE can be modified 
to be a "reasonable" renegotiation-proof equilibrium concept when players accept the theory 
of stability (they interpret deviations from a Nash equilibrium, not as mistakes, but as 
something to be rationalized). 
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APPENDIX 
Kohlberg and Mertens (1986): 
"We will say that a set of equilibria is stable in a game G if it is minimal with 
respect to the following property: 
PROPERTY (8): 8 is a closed set of Nash Equilibria of G satisfying: for any E > 0 there 
exists some 00>0 such that for any completely mixed strategy vector "Y1, ... ,"Yn (n players) 
and for any 01, ... ,On' (O<Oj<oo), the perturbed game where every strategy s of player 
i is replaced by (1-0j)s +Oi"Yi has an equilibrium €-closed to 8. 
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